Preemptionism Socialized: Rethinking Epistemic Authority through Socially Extended Cognition

How should laypeople rationally respond to an epistemic authority’s testimony if they already have their own reasons concerning the subject matter? Preemptionism requires laypeople to adopt the authority’s testimony p as the sole reason for believing p. The total evidence view (TVE) requires that the authority’s testimony p be aggregated with laypeople’s total evidence regarding the issue. I defend preemptionism from the perspective of socially extended cognition. Epistemic authorities and laypeople are not separate; rather, they form a united social cognitive process in which both groups play unique roles and interact with one another. In this sense, laypeople’s cognition extends into a social dimension and aggregating with others’ (e.g., authorities or institutions) epistemic endeavors to accomplish epistemic goals. If we understand the authority-laypeople relationship within this framework, preemptionism offers the best way to understand authoritative testimony and addresses the objections. Therefore, a more socialized version of preemptionism is proposed.

The New Wedge of Cognitive Attitudes and the Dichotomy of Values in Science

The Value-Free Ideal (VFI) insists on the dichonomy between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Proponents of this ideal argue that to safeguard the goal of truth-seeking. However, in recent discussions, the argument from inductive risk shows that non-cognitive values should also play a legitimate role. In response, advocates of the VFI turn to different cognitive attitudes present in science. I critically review this line of thought, focusing especially on Hugh Lacey’s strategy. I argue that there is no solid method or reason for us to distinguish between the attitudes strictly. By examining feminist and pragmatist critiques of the epistemic/non-epistemic dichotomy, I advocate for a holistic approach to understanding scientific research, asserting that the three attitudes are all integrated into scientific inquiry, influenced by both epistemic and non-epistemic considerations. I present three arguments against Lacey, alongside a general strategy against authors for VFI who accept the distinction of cognitive attitudes.